“Putin's regime could fall if he loses the support of just a few hundred people."

The author of the book "How Tyrants Fall" on the specifics of dictatorships and how they collapse.

Despite their outward monolithic appearance, autocratic regimes have a number of weaknesses, says Marcel Dirsus, a political scientist and author of the book "How Tyrants Fall," released in July and recently included in The Economist's list of the best books of 2024. But the bad news is that democratization after dictatorships is extremely rare. The Bell editor Viacheslav Dvornikov spoke with Dirsus about how dictators lose power, whether it is possible to increase the chances of a democratic transition, why Alexei Navalny posed such a danger to the Russian regime, and what Russian civil society can do now.

How Putin's regime will fall

— Can we guess, based on the history of dozens of authoritarian regimes, how Putin's regime will fall? Will it be due to a conspiracy of elites, mass protests, or something else?

— For personalist dictatorships like Putin’s regime, the biggest threat typically comes from regime insiders. The less democratic a regime becomes, the more a dictator relies on a very small number of people in order to stay in power. The flip side of that is that Putin could fall if he loses the support of perhaps only a few hundred people. 

I can't see into the future, but given everything that we know about the way the Russian regime works, as well as the history of the fall of tyrants, the main threat does not come from the masses in the streets, but from those closest to him.

— What would be the optimal scenario for the transition of power in Russia? And, in terms of possibilities, is a peaceful transition of power or democratization possible?

— We have to differentiate between the most likely scenario and the scenario that would be most desirable. The highest chance of creating a sustainable democracy occurs if dictators are toppled with nonviolent methods. The more violence that is used, the less likely it becomes that you will not only topple the dictator but also lead the country toward democracy. Thus, the optimal scenario would be if Putin to be removed through nonviolent protests.

To me, the more likely scenario is that palace elites or men with guns decide to remove Putin because they believe they could gain more power or wealth by doing so. However, that scenario does not guarantee that Russia will transition to a democracy. It is just as easy to imagine a situation where another dictator assumes power instead.

— You studied the history of the Politburo and the Communist Party of the USSR. In the 1950s, after Stalin died, members of the Politburo realized that centralized power in the hands of one person was dangerous. What are the chances that Russian elites might prefer not having centralized power in the future, and maybe even support a rule of law so that, like everyone else, they are not in constant danger, as is the case in dictator regimes?

— Succession is something that dictatorships are incredibly bad at. Democracies like the United Kingdom, Germany, or France are extremely good at organizing succession because, as one leader is voted out of office, another comes in, and usually, the process is smooth. And even if it is not, there are institutions in place to handle disputes between different parties. 

But personal dictatorships like Russia don't have anything like that because there are no functioning institutions, and Putin has no interest in grooming a potential successor. The moment you build up a potential successor, you create a different power center, and that could become a risk. 

This is not a new problem. It has existed throughout history. Even monarchs in the Middle Ages struggled with how to organize succession effectively. When you look at the regime elites around these dictators or kings, their concern is usually not for any particular person but for the continued existence of the system itself. It is the system that provides them with power and opportunities for enrichment.

So, the most likely scenario, if Putin were to, say, die tomorrow from a heart attack, is that the regime elites would try to rally around a new figure to continue leading the regime. The nightmare scenario, of course, would be a complete collapse, leading to a freefall where things could escalate to the point of civil war. We've seen similar situations unfold in other countries, like Sudan.

I think much would depend on how Putin would leave office. There’s a theory that if dictators are allowed to die of natural causes, it usually means that the regime elites have already identified someone who could be a consensus candidate. This is because if they didn’t have such a person in mind, they would have a strong incentive to move against the dictator the moment he shows any sign of weakness.

We see this mechanism play out repeatedly throughout history. If we look at Syria, for example, when Bashar al-Assad’s father died, the Syrian regime elites essentially agreed on Bashar al-Assad to take over — not because they thought he was the best person to rule the country, but because they believed he was the best option to maintain the regime's continuity.

— Right now, it seems like Putin's regime looks monolithic, the elites are united, mass protests are not possible. You wrote in the book that this situation could be a mirage. Why do you think so?

— Living in liberal democracies, we often have this image of all-powerful dictators who snap their fingers and instantly get whatever they want. We imagine these rulers with absolute power who don’t need anyone else to maintain their rule.

But that’s a myth. Whether it's Vladimir Putin, Kim Jong-un, or dictators in the past, all of them rely on other people to stay in power. The moment these people withdraw their support, everything can change in a moment.

Many of these regimes appear very stable — until they aren’t. There are tipping points where dictators suddenly seem weak, and the people around them quickly decide to start opposing them rather than supporting them. 

— But what could trigger this in Russia’s case? There is a widespread belief that only a loss in the war in Ukraine could make Putin's regime fall, because maybe the elites would see that he is weak. But at the same time, it seems like propaganda could spin everything into a victory.

— The biggest risk to Putin right now comes from the men with guns. Even though propaganda can convince a lot of people of many things, if the Ukrainians were to gain the upper hand and push back the Russian military, I can imagine a scenario where those men with guns realize that all the fighting and dying has been for nothing.

In that case, there could be a situation where Putin is deposed by his own soldiers or mercenaries. We've already seen episodes of instability. The Wagner march towards Moscow seemed highly unlikely until it actually happened. So, unforeseen events happen all the time, and it's incredibly difficult to predict these things.

Another scenario that could cause Putin serious trouble is if he were to experience health problems. Dictators usually go to great lengths to hide any health issues, not only from the public but also from palace elites. The reason is simple: expectations matter. If you're one of the people keeping Putin in power, you’re not just concerned with what happens today; you’re thinking about what happens tomorrow or a year from now. If, for instance, it will be revealed that Putin were to get cancer and that became common knowledge, some of the people around him might decide it's no longer worth the risk to support him, especially if they think he might not be around in a year or two. They might then choose to back someone else.

— What can ordinary people or civil society do to change the balance of power, to influence the mood of the elites?

— Truth be told, the influence of ordinary Russians is severely limited. And that's, of course, no coincidence, because the Russian government has spent a lot of time and resources reducing the threat from the street.

Ordinarily, you might have a scenario in which civil society mobilizes and brings people out into the streets. As the numbers grow, the regime is forced into a decision: either allow the protests to continue or crack down on them. If a dictator lets the protests go on, he reveals to the public that he is weak and not in control of the country, which is a bad outcome for him. But if he decides to use violence and shoot at protesters, he risks a backlash. This can lead to the regime splitting.

And you see that over and over again. You have all these people in the streets — women, children, pensioners. At that moment, when the regime is forced to shoot in order to demonstrate its strength, some within the regime may refuse to go along with it. Perhaps soldiers will refuse orders, or policemen will refuse to beat women. Or perhaps someone in the palace will say, 'Look, I'm not going to go along with this.' But the problem in today's Russia is that even reaching the point of mobilizing large numbers of people to protest in the streets is extremely difficult, because the risks of protesting are so high that few are willing to take that chance. And, of course, that is completely understandable.

— The Soviet Union collapsed not because of the war in Afghanistan, which actually cost tens of thousands of lives, but because of economic problems. Could the same thing happen with Putin's Russia? Can we imagine a scenario where, after five or ten years, the economy collapses due to sanctions, people’s wealth decreases, and this brings mass protests to the streets? 

— If you're a dictator, you need to create some positive outcomes for certain people. Not everyone can be poor, not everyone can be powerless. So you need to keep some people happy, even in undemocratic regimes. When it comes to the Russian economy, we often have this image that Russia has unlimited resources, can produce endless weapons, and has an endless supply of soldiers. But obviously, none of this is true. It’s possible to imagine a scenario where, due to sanctions, mismanagement, or the government spending all its money on the war, there isn’t enough left to keep the key people happy. On the other hand, while the war is terrible for many Russians, it benefits some who matter to the regime. War always brings opportunities for corruption. People can make money by evading sanctions, so it doesn't have to be bad for everyone around Putin that he's waging this war.

— I can believe that there are some beneficiaries of the war. But there are also a lot of businessmen — we call them oligarchs — who really suffered from the war. For example, they lost business or they have to stay in Russia because they've been sanctioned. They’re probably upset, but right now they can't say anything to the regime because, surprisingly, all those oligarchs are powerless and don't have a voice. Can this bring some more instability?

— It's definitely possible, but the question is, can outsiders make life miserable enough for them to take the risk of challenging Putin? They might be upset about having their yacht seized or about no longer being able to use their private jet to fly around the world. But overall, the life of Russian oligarchs is probably still pretty good. And I’m not sure that there’s the political will in Western liberal democracies to really tighten the screws on them.

These businessmen have no desire to die, and they presumably don’t want to end up in a labor camp. They need to see a realistic possibility that the opposition could succeed, that there is some sort of alternative. This is probably not what they believe right now, but that doesn’t mean it can’t change in the future.

— You mentioned the lack of political will in Western countries, like Germany and the US, regarding sanctions. What can they do, if anything, to accelerate the fall of the regime?

— Let me first answer in general, and then I'll address this specifically for Russia. Regimes have three parts: the incumbent, the elites who keep him in power, and the broader citizenry. What you really need to do is weaken the incumbent, encourage the regime elites to oppose him, and strengthen the masses. If you only weaken the incumbent while encouraging the elites to take him out, you could easily end up in a situation where you simply replace one dictator with another. So it's essential to empower the masses, and there are a variety of ways to do all three.

But just as staying in power as a dictator involves trade-offs, so does trying to topple one. Nothing is free, and there’s always a price to pay, no matter what strategy you choose.

Let me give you some examples. When it comes to empowering citizens, you can support independent journalism, train people to use technology to mobilize, grant exile to dissidents, use political influence to persuade neighboring countries to host opponents, and so on. There’s a lot that can be done to strengthen the masses.

The problem with these strategies, however, is that while nonviolent approaches might work in many dictatorships around the world, there's a low chance they will succeed in toppling the most entrenched dictators, like Putin or Kim Jong-un. So, eventually, outside powers will face a choice: they can either continue using nonviolent methods and prepare the citizens of those countries for the moment when the dictator weakens, or they can choose to use violence to try to speed up that moment. But the problem with using violence, as we’ve discussed, is that it decreases the chances of creating a sustainable outcome.

It may sound counterintuitive, but when it comes to Russia, outside powers actually have more influence on toppling Putin than they do with many other countries. The reason for that is the war against Ukraine, because the likeliest scenario in which Putin falls is if the Ukrainians win and the Russian military loses. And this is, of course, something that, with enough political will, Western powers can influence greatly.

Understanding this, Putin will do everything possible to stay in power. More than two-thirds of personal dictators end up in prison, exile, or dead after losing power. Now that he has started this war, and his fate is likely tied to either victory or defeat in Ukraine, it's possible to imagine Putin deciding that, rather than lose the war, he would be willing to use nuclear weapons.

There's probably concern in Western capitals that if Ukraine were given the support needed to defeat the Russian military, it could lead Putin to feel cornered and to consider the use of nuclear weapons. That consideration, in turn, makes it less likely that Western countries will provide Ukrainians with the necessary weapons.

— Could the elites stop Putin from using nuclear weapons?

— If Putin were to discuss the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine, it's certainly possible that regime elites would try to depose him. They would understand that their chances of survival would drastically decrease if Russia were to use nuclear weapons.

It might seem odd to say that they would try to depose him since he appears strong — sitting at long tables in big palaces, surrounded by armed men. But ultimately, he's only powerful as long as people believe him to be powerful.

As soon as those around him decide to remove him, they will. Imagine you're a high-ranking intelligence official still capable of rational thinking. You're at the table where Putin is discussing nuclear weapons, and you know that a tactical nuclear strike in Ukraine could lead to an American military response. Would that change your thinking? It likely would, because everyone wants to survive, and everyone wants their children to survive. The risk of something going catastrophically wrong would drastically increase if Putin were to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine. So yes, I can definitely imagine this leading to his downfall.

How do sanctions affect dictatorships

— For a long time, Western countries conducted business with Russia as usual. Businesses invested significant amounts in Russia when the country was already autocratic, if not dictatorial. Germany was purchasing large amounts of gas from Russia. Do you think this was a mistake from the very beginning?

— I believe Germany's policy towards Russia has been one of the most significant foreign policy failures of the last couple of decades. It's a policy that has failed on nearly every level, and you can see that everywhere. German politicians not only did drastically miscalculate what the Russian government would do, but in their efforts to engage with Putin, they also ended up corrupting themselves. This wasn’t just about policy in Germany, but also about people making a lot of money in the process.

As for the impact this might have had on the war, there are different perspectives. Some believe that this engagement delayed the war for as long as it did. Former German Chancellor Angela Merkel would have argued that basically she bought time, which I think is unconvincing.

Some people say that Germany should have pursued an even more conciliatory policy towards Russia, that there shouldn’t have been talk of Ukraine joining NATO or the European Union, and that if those discussions hadn't happened, this war could have been avoided. 

Putin probably thought he had a limited amount of time to try to subjugate Ukraine before it became stronger and more closely integrated with the West. So I think it influenced the timing of the attack. However, I find it unconvincing to suggest that this war is primarily about NATO or EU membership of Ukraine. I believe it’s really about Putin wanting to dominate Ukraine and subjugate Ukrainians, as he doesn’t see Ukraine as an independent country. And of course, all the money that has flowed into Russia, allowing this system of patronage to flourish, has only enabled Putin.

— Do you think this failure of Germany's foreign policy was due to underestimating and misinterpreting the dictatorial nature of Putin's regime? It seems that the West, in general, does not oppose dictatorial regimes until they start invading other countries. Should the policy towards such regimes be reconsidered?

— I think it's even more dramatic than that. There are certain non-democracies that Western leaders don't have an issue with, even if they invade other countries. Politicians talk a lot about the importance of values and standing up to dictators, but in the real world, when it comes to making deals and advancing national interests, almost every country is fine with dealing with monarchs, dictators, and those who have committed atrocities.

When we look at Germany and Russia specifically, some issues are unique to Germany and the Germans, while others are tied to the German-Russian relationship. History, especially World War II and the Holocaust, casts a long shadow. For many decades, Germans were very reluctant to have a powerful military. They didn’t want to see soldiers in public life, didn’t want to export weapons, and were skeptical that anything positive could come from using military power. This led them to adopt policies that were not based on military strength or hard power.

Many Germans genuinely believed that the way to influence Russia positively was to bind Moscow closer, hoping this would change its behavior. Of course, this approach is the exact opposite of how many Central European countries view Russia. They believe that the only thing that can influence Moscow's actions is showing strength, rather than trying to draw them closer.

— It seems that the West woke up after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Sanctions were imposed on Russia. Now, it seems that they haven't worked because China didn't join the sanctions, and everything Russia used to get from Europe or the U.S. is now coming from China. But at the same time, the sanctions have led to the consolidation of the elites. How successful have the sanctions been? And how do sanctions usually affect dictatorships?

— The idea behind these sanctions is to influence a government's behavior through economic incentives. The difficulty in applying this to Russia is that it's a country rich in natural resources. History shows that sanctions are often very difficult to enforce effectively against countries with abundant oil or gas. The reason is that oil and gas are such valuable commodities that these countries will always find buyers. So while the dictatorship might not receive the full amount it would normally get because of a discount, they will still be able to sell their resources and make money from them.

You're right to say that the sanctions haven't been perfect. If they were, the war would already be over. But I don’t think the continuation of the war is necessarily a sign that the sanctions have failed. The way I see it, the sanctions create trouble, forcing the Russian government to divert resources to keep the economy afloat. They also make it harder to prosecute the war on a daily basis. But, of course, they aren’t the game changer that some people initially hoped they would be.

— One of the important topics we’ve been discussing over the past few months concerns the reshuffle within the Russian Ministry of Defense. Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu was dismissed right in the middle of the war, and several of his deputies ended up in prison. How do you interpret this: is it part of preventing an elite conspiracy? And how might the dictator’s relationships with his inner circle change during the war?

— Purges are a key part of what keeps dictators in power. Every now and then, you need to cut someone down to send a signal to everyone else that you're in charge. But purges are as much an art as they are a science because, as a dictator, you need to avoid going too far. If every week someone is jailed, loses their job, or disappears, you could create a situation where the elites around you decide the risk to themselves is too great, and they might unite to depose you. So, you have to be careful not to overdo it.

The advantage, of course, is that every high-ranking official in Russia is guilty of something whether it’s diverting funds meant for procurement or stealing money that should have gone to soldiers. Putin has "sanitized" corruption to keep the system alive. So, if he wants to get rid of someone and send him to jail, you always have a "good reason" to do so. But again, you can’t go too far.

— It seems that, despite the war, Russia still relies on technocrats, at least in the economic sector, to manage both the war and the economy. What can you say about the role of technocrats in power?

— It's important to understand that incompetence is a core feature of dictatorships. Dictators prioritize maintaining power above all else, and they only need to please a small number of people to stay in power. This leads them to promote people who are good at playing the game. People who succeed in these systems are those who won’t deliver bad news to the dictator. Instead, they will try to convince him that everything is going according to plan, for example, that Ukraine will be conquered in three days. Obviously, being good at playing by these rules doesn’t necessarily correlate with competence.

What you see in Russia with these technocrats, though, is something almost uncharacteristic of a dictatorship: a recognition that certain fields are so important they cannot be handled by yes-men who simply try to stay close to power. These fields need to be managed by people who actually know what they're doing. Because if you put someone incompetent in charge of these areas, the danger could become very real.

What challenges a dictator

— Putin has been in power for 24 years. What can we say about the psychology of a dictator after such a long reign?

— The psychology of dictators is a fascinating topic. Many of these people are not normal in any conventional sense. They might be psychopaths, comfortable with committing horrible atrocities regularly, and still able to sleep at night. These are not people like you or me. Their psychological makeup is very different, even from the moment they come into power.

We often view them as irrational madmen, immune to any sort of incentives, but that’s simply not true. In fact, I would argue that most of them are rational. If they weren’t, they wouldn’t be able to make the trade-offs necessary to stay in power.

History offers examples of this. During the Cold War in Equatorial Guinea, there was a dictator named Francisco Macías Nguema. He would walk around his palace calling out the names of people he had killed and ask his servants to set the table for guests who weren’t there. He would then proceed to talk to them as if they were present. Eventually, the people around him realized he could no longer distinguish between friend and foe, and, feeling in immediate danger, they killed him before he could kill them.

All this is to say that I think Putin is a rational actor, though his psychology is far from normal. It’s not just about how these people come to power; it’s also about what power does to them. It’s difficult to imagine the impact of having everyone around you constantly trying to please you not just in a usual work setting, but in a context where dissent could mean death. You’re treated almost like a deity, and that cannot be healthy.

This obsession with staying in power leads dictators to surround themselves not only with yes-men but also with people who share a particular worldview. Many of the people around Putin, for example, are obsessed with security — not for the country, but for the regime. When you constantly surround yourself with intelligence officials, police, and military personnel, their way of thinking rubs off on you. Over time, this detachment from the normal worldview only worsens.

— The Putin regime clearly cares about opinion polls. Why do dictators need popular support?

— This is something I also wondered about when I started researching this. I asked myself, why even bother having elections? If you’re a dictator and you're going to rig the outcome anyway, why invest all this time and money into holding elections in the first place? The answer is twofold.

First, it gives you legitimacy. Even though most people know the elections aren’t fair, it still helps to be able to say that millions of people across the country support you. That legitimacy is important because it reduces the risk of backlash in response to repression. The more people believe you're legitimate, the fewer people will be out in the streets protesting, and the fewer people you have to beat down. The less violence you have to use, the less likely things are to escalate against you. 

The second reason is information. We’ve already talked about the dictator’s dilemma of never having access to good information because people around you tend to lie. The advantage of holding elections or conducting polls is that they give you real insight into what people are thinking. It might reveal, for example, a particular issue that you’ve neglected but people care deeply about, allowing you to address it. Or, through an election, you might find out that someone far from Moscow, in a remote region, is gaining popularity and could potentially mobilize people against you. In response, you could then decide to jail that person or use other forms of harassment.

So really, these elections and polls are about both legitimacy and information.

— When Russia started the war and then announced mobilization, it broke a kind of "contract" that existed between society and Putin: That the citizens stay out of politics, and the state leaves them alone. We estimated that after the invasion of Ukraine, more than 650,000 people left Russia. This is significant, but not overwhelming. In your opinion, are there historical parallels where such social contracts were broken, and what were the consequences?

— It is clear that Putin is very reluctant to force ordinary Russians to fight. You can see this in how he is now offering more money to people who sign up, and also encouraging the regions to offer additional incentives. Obviously, he’s doing it because they clearly don’t have enough volunteers, and he doesn’t want to force people to fight if he can get them to do it by paying them.

That alone tells us he is extremely worried about what might happen if he forces more and more people to fight. It’s one thing to watch propaganda about the "special military operation" on television, but it's another when your son, brother, or husband is forced to fight and die in Ukraine.

Even though Putin has succeeded in severely reducing the threat from the masses within Russia, this is an explosive issue that could backfire. This is especially true if the war is not going well. It’s one thing to endure so much death and needless tragedy, but it’s another when all these people are dying for nothing — when there is no land or victory to show for it. So, I believe this is a topic that must be deeply concerning to him.

— At the beginning of the war, it seemed that as more people died, one could expect protests from their relatives. But it has now been two and a half years, and possibly more than 100,000 Russians have died. Excluding the first weeks of the campaign, we have seen only small-scale street protests, including by a few dozen women in Dagestan. Is this a success of Putin's dictatorial regime?

— From the perspective of the dictatorship, this is a massive success, and I think it's likely due to three factors.

The first is the general difficulty of mobilizing protests in Russia, something Putin has worked on for many years.

The second is the narrative that the Russian government has managed to disseminate within the country. While I know many Russians don’t believe the government, there are clearly millions who do. Many genuinely think this war is about "liberating Ukraine from Nazism," and that even though Russians are dying, it’s worth it for a greater cause.

The third factor to consider is who is actually dying. While many Russians have lost their lives, these are not the Russians that matter to the regime. It’s one thing for someone from a Siberian village to die, but it’s another for the son of an oligarch or someone from Moscow to die. As long as the regime can continue to disproportionately push the burden of this war onto the poorest, the most vulnerable, and those with the least power in society, they have a good chance of pulling through.

However, that’s not guaranteed, because while Russia is a big country with a large population, that population isn’t infinite. Russia already has massive demographic problems, and as more soldiers die, Putin will eventually have to find new recruits. In the future, he may not be able to be as selective about who goes to fight and die.

— Among those who left the country, there is likely a significant portion who do not support the regime, as well as those who can find work in other countries, such as IT specialists. One could assume that it would be more beneficial for the regime if they stayed and worked within the country. But how do dictatorial regimes view those who oppose them? Is it advantageous for the Russian regime that many people who do not support Putin have left?

— It's a double-edged sword. Political scientists often talk about acts of commission and acts of omission. So, you either do something you're not supposed to, like protesting or not showing up for work — such as a strike. 

When we consider whether this migration is good or bad for the regime, that also factors in. On one hand, it worsens the demographic problem. You're losing a lot of specialists who could otherwise be used, for example, to prosecute the war against Ukraine. But, on the other hand, you get rid of the "troublesome" people who could have caused problems for the regime. Therefore, it's hard to say definitively whether this is good or bad for the regime.

Given how difficult it is for Russians to make a difference within Russia, and the risks involved in openly opposing the regime while there, I can certainly understand why people choose to leave. It's always easy for someone, like me being German and in Germany, to say, "Why don't these people protest? Why don't they resist?" But the reality is that I'm not at risk of being sent to a labor camp or disappearing. So, I can absolutely understand why people would want to leave.

— How dangerous are political figures like Alexei Navalny to the regime? What is usually more advantageous for a tyrant: keeping them in prison or exiling them from the country?

— The danger of a figure like Navalny lies in how they shatter the illusion of inevitability. In the absence of figures like him, it can seem as though it's always going to be Putin, with no alternative in sight. But when you have someone that many people look up to, someone who can mobilize people to protest or oppose the regime online, suddenly it looks like Putin is not inevitable, that there could be a different future — maybe a democratic one, maybe a better and more prosperous one. This is the real threat to regimes like Putin's: they break the myth of invincibility and inevitability.

When it comes to dealing with figures like Navalny, dictatorships often find it useful to apply targeted repression rather than broader measures that affect more people. For instance, if you can just take out Navalny or lock him away, the risk of backlash is lower than if you were to shoot into a crowd of protesters. But that's not always the case — politics doesn't work like the laws of physics. Sometimes when you try to remove one piece from the chessboard, everything else falls apart.

As for what’s better — locking those figures up or exiling them — it’s impossible to say definitively. It depends on the situation and the profile of the individual both inside and outside the country. Someone like Navalny gained so much attention abroad that he would still have been a thorn in the regime's side, even if he had been in Germany. But other political figures in other countries don't have that level of international recognition, and regimes might prefer to get rid of them, especially if their influence is not that strong.

Putin, for instance, can lock up almost anyone for whatever reason, unless he oversteps with the elites. He can make people disappear, which allows him to deal with someone like Navalny without needing to send him abroad. But not all countries have regimes as powerful as Moscow's, so the strategies might differ.

— How important is propaganda for dictatorial regimes? Are there any universal narratives that they use?

— Yes, propaganda is extremely important for all the governments I describe in the book. Every regime has some sort of narrative they try to push onto others. For example, the dictatorship in Rwanda claims to have lifted millions out of poverty. Some of the Gulf monarchies boast of turning barren deserts into marvels of modern engineering. Putin argues that he is restoring Russia's strength while standing up to "degenerate" Western societies, which he portrays as a threat to the "Russian" way of life.

So, all of these dictatorships have their own narratives, but one thing they have in common is that they all rely on projecting strength. They want to be seen as strong and inevitable, using this perception to gain legitimacy and prevent people from rising up against them.

— It seems that authoritarian regimes around the world are uniting to oppose liberal democracy, promoting narratives that foster cynicism, nihilism, and contempt for rights and freedoms. They also find support in countries like Hungary or among the right-wing in the U.S. What ideas can be opposed to these narratives?

— Many people in liberal democracies see the paralysis of their government. They see that governments can't build airports, repair roads, etc. This dissatisfaction creates an opening that non-democratic regimes can exploit to their advantage.

However, despite all the weaknesses of democracies, they have a better story to tell. The reason for this is that democracies provide better outcomes for more people. This ties back to what we discussed earlier: if you want to become president of the United States, you need the support of millions of people. But if you're Kim Jong-un and want to stay in power, you only need the support of maybe 100 or so families in Pyongyang. Everyone else is essentially unimportant.

That doesn’t mean democracies are perfect. Of course, there are many disadvantaged people, and there is outside influence from the rich and powerful. These are real problems that need to be addressed. But on a structural level, there is a significant difference between democracies and dictatorships. And I think we need to focus more on telling that story.

— How have the internet and technology affected authoritarian regimes? It seems that modern dictatorships are very different from what they were, say, 50 years ago.

— Yes, there was a time during the Arab Spring when many observers thought that technology would lead to liberation. They believed that the internet would make it easier for people to come together, mobilize, and oppose repressive regimes. However, it has since become clear that this was an overly optimistic view, as dictatorships have also learned to use technology for their own purposes.

Even during the Arab Spring, this was already happening. In Bahrain, for example, the regime used social media to get ordinary citizens to crack down on regime opponents and demonstrators. In addition to that, we now see censorship, bots spreading propaganda, and people being jailed for something they posted on social media. So, it's a double-edged sword.

However, we shouldn't overlook the positive effects. Secure messaging can be used to circumvent government surveillance, and it's much easier to reach large numbers of people — even from home or in exile — than it was in the past, when the government could almost completely stop you from doing so. So, while it's not as positive as we once thought, there are still opportunities to fight back.

— I have one last question. Do you have any good news for us?

— Sometimes things can feel very depressing. We look at all these powerful dictators, surrounded by the bayonets of their soldiers, sitting in their presidential palaces. But the truth is, these people are much more fragile than they appear. They spend much of their time worrying about survival and clinging to power.

Take the Arab Spring, for example. We often think of it as a failure because most of those countries are not liberal democracies today. But in reality, it's too early to tell. Tunisia, for instance, doesn’t look great now — many of the democratic gains have evaporated. However, we can only truly judge success or failure in the future. In 100 years, we might look back and say, "Yes, the Arab Spring didn’t immediately bring democracy to Tunisia, but it was a key moment in the country’s eventual path toward liberal democracy."

The same could theoretically be true for Russia. Right now, we see the post-Cold War period as a failure of democracy. But perhaps in 100 years, we’ll look back and see that, while it was a turbulent time, it didn’t transition smoothly from the Soviet Union to democracy because of Putin. However, this period might eventually be seen as having planted the seeds for a sustainable democracy.