THE BELL WEEKLY: How Russia lost Syria

Hello! This week we look into Russia’s retreat from Syria after the fall of Bashar Assad and his regime. We also tell the story of a PR man appointed new Kursk governor and how the ruble recovers after a recent slump.

How did the Kremlin squander Syria

After more than 20 years in power, Syrian president Bashir Assad saw his regime collapse in the space of two dramatic weeks. Russia, mired in its own war in Ukraine, did not come to the rescue, largely leaving him to face the country’s opposition forces alone. Nine years ago Moscow invested huge time and effort in saving Assad’s regime at the peak of the civil war. This time it lacked both the strength and resources.

• Moscow’s alliance with Syria dates back to the Cold War, with Russia having maintained geopolitical influence in the three decades after the Soviet Union’s collapse. Syria was a long-term buyer of Russian weapons, and its Mediterranean port of Tartus is home to a logistics center for the Russian navy — an important strategic asset for Russia, and Moscow’s most important naval base.
• After the outbreak of civil war, Russia and the West tried to work together to resolve the conflict but were unable to achieve anything through talks. In 2015, the situation turned dire for Damascus as Islamic State fighters began to seize provincial Syrian cities and Assad’s regime appeared more fragile than ever. Russia swooped to his aid, launching a full-scale military operation to support the Syrian government army. Russia’s decision was at least partly motivated by the Kremlin’s need to prove that it was still an important player on the international arena after the imposition of sanctions and threats of global isolation after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. 
• Moscow’s military support never involved any official Russian soldiers on the ground. Russian airstrikes were carried out in sorties launched from the Syrian air base at Khmeimim. Although Russia said it was targeting “terrorists” and “extremists” it quickly became clear that Syrian opposition forces were also being targeted by these strikes. In terms of a ground presence, mercenaries from the Wagner Group played an important role, acting in partnership with the Russian military command in Syria. When their soldiers were killed, Russia would respond by claiming that it did not work with any private military companies (this position completely changed after the invasion of Ukraine). This allowed Russian generals to attach themselves to any paramilitary units’ successes on the ground, while the authorities could deny Russian losses in Syria. 
• The active phase of the operation was over by the end of 2017 and the bulk of Russia’s forces and assets were withdrawn. Syria became the most important logistics hub for Russian soldiers and mercenaries, with Wagner Group forces travelling through there to fight in African countries like Sudan, Libya, Mali and the Central African Republic.
• Even after active operations came to an end, Russian planes continued strikes against Syrian opposition positions. For example, in August last year they attacked the base of the Islamist Hayrat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), whose troops led the shock offensive that toppled Assad. At the time, and until recently, the Russian authorities described the opposition as “militants” and “terrorists” — but since the fall of Assad, the rhetoric has changed. The same thing happened on Russian state TV. 
• In the face of the offensive, Russia refused to save Assad’s regime and hastily withdrew its warships from its Syrian base. Pro-war bloggers believe that Russia has completely abandoned Syria, and both the Khmeimim military base and the naval base at Tartus will be “withdrawn.”

Why the world should care

Since the start of the offensive, attention on the Kremlin has intensified. The question was whether Moscow would again, as in 2015, rush to Assad’s aid. There were no surprises: Russia is too busy with its war in Ukraine and there are simply not the resources — manpower or equipment — to launch another full-scale military operation. 

If we believe reports from Russian agencies, Assad and his family are in Moscow, where Russia has granted them asylum. If that’s the case, it turns out that the former Syrian leader has ended up sharing the fate of ex-Ukrainian president Vladimir Yanukovych, who fled Kyiv in 2014 in the face of the Euromaidan protests. Ironically, in 2014, Assad had tried to reassure Putin that he was no Yanukovych and would never flee Syria.

PR man appointed Kursk governor 

Russia’s Kursk Region, partially occupied by Ukrainian forces, has got its second new governor in under a year. The Russian army has failed to recapture the region since Ukrainian troops stormed across the border in August, and it faces a social catastrophe which has forced residents into rare public protest. The region’s new leader is Alexander Khinshtein, a high-profile politician who has, in recent weeks, proved more popular than several parliamentary old-timers.

• It’s rare for the appointment of a Russian governor to make international headlines, but Khinshtein’s case is an exception. Partially occupied, the western border region is currently the most sensitive in the whole country for the Kremlin. Russian troops are trying to chase Ukrainian forces out, while Kyiv’s troops, in turn, have been ordered to hold their positions at all costs ahead of US President-elect Donald Trump’s inauguration. If they succeed, control over the region could be an important card Ukraine can play in any ceasefire negotiations.
• For the local Russian authorities, the humanitarian situation in the Kursk region remains difficult. More than 100,000 residents from along the Ukrainian border had to leave their homes and move to temporary accommodation centers or rented apartments. Dozens of displaced persons voiced their anger in November at the perceived sluggishness with which the authorities are issuing housing certificates to compensate them for buying new homes. Residents are alsocomplaining that they have not received promised support payments of up to $1,500 for those who lost or had their houses partly damaged. It appears the Kremlin felt the previous governor Alexei Smirnov, in post for barely 200 days, was unable to cope with the task. Putin’s press secretary Dmitry Peskov indirectly confirmed this, saying Khinshtein was appointed acting governor due to the need for “crisis management” in the region. 
• Khinshtein, who heads the State Duma’s information committee, has been almost more visible than the parliament’s speaker Vyacheslav Volodin over recent months. Khinshtein announced the slowdown of YouTube, published and then became the leading advocate of the latest law on LGBT propaganda, and was the main spokesman for laws toughening the foreign agent framework. Moreover, his public comments indicate he is operating as a PR-man for Viktor Zolotov, commander of the National Guard.

Why the world should care

The head of the Kursk region is one of the few Russian governor positions which comes with a federal profile and the ear of Vladimir Putin. The example of Vyacheslav Gladkov, the governor of the neighboring Belgorod Region which comes under frequent Ukrainian shelling and drone attacks, is an indicative case. By the end of 2023 he was among the top 10 most mentioned politicians in Russian media — ahead of several notable figures, including ex-president and vocal hawk Dmitry Medvedev. Khinshtein has every opportunity to make himself even more prominent.

Ruble stabilizes after latest sanctions slump 

The ruble has recovered from a sudden devaluation last month, which was largely tied to liquidity problems in the wake of US sanctions against dozens of Russian banks — chiefly Gazprombank. The value of the currency against both the dollar and the yuan, on various measures, had reached its worst level since March 2022.

• The ruble routinely traded close to the psychologically important mark of 100 against the dollar on the interbank markets throughout the first few weeks of November. But it plunged into a fresh crisis after November 21, when the US imposed sanctions on state lender Gazprombank, which handles all international payments for Russian gas. The ruble was trading at 113 rubles against the dollar and 119 against the euro in the interbank market days after that decision. On the Moscow Exchange (where dollars and euros are no longer traded), the Chinese yuan hit 15 rubles. You can read more about the currency crisis here.
• By the end of last week, the ruble had recovered, with the dollar rate climbing back above the symbolic 100-mark. The official exchange rate, which the central bank sets based on market trading patterns, was set at 99.4 rubles over the weekend. The rate for the euro, also based on interbank trading, was set at 106.3 rubles and the yuan was trading at 13.5 rubles.
• The ruble’s support came from people taking advantage of the fall to replenish their supply of Russian currency for the months ahead, as well as a reduction in speculative operations, Russian experts believe. This was aided by the Central Bank’s decision to suspend some foreign currency purchases until the end of the year (usually it sells rubles to replenish the National Welfare Fund, Russia’s piggy bank of excess oil and gas profits). Market players expect that new mechanisms to pay for exports will be found, and Vladimir Putin recently cancelled the requirement for foreign buyers to direct all payments for Russian gas through Gazprombank.

Why the world should care

The increased volatility of the ruble has certainly become a problem in the Russian economy due to sanctions and the disbalances they create. But it is too early to bury the Russian currency — Moscow’s economic authorities have sufficient tools to stabilize and support the ruble.