Europe without Russian gas

The EU has taken another technical step towards completely phasing out Russian oil and gas by 2028, with EU ambassadors formally submitting the proposal to member states for consideration, Reuters reported. The details should be resolved at a ministerial meeting before the Oct. 20 vote.

• The big news is that the EU has overcome the so-called “gas dissidents.” Hungary and Slovakia, both dependent on Russian oil, objected to the ban. However, the proposal requires only a qualified majority of EU members, so their position has no impact.
• Technical details must be agreed by Oct. 20. One question is how the EU can verify that gas, especially LNG, is not of Russian origin. The proposal to do that is a double-guarantee mechanism: preliminary approval of the shipment, and then customs examination on arrival in port. France and Italy are proposing one or the other, until the system is up and running.
• The document will oblige all countries to cease short-term oil and gas imports by June 2026 and end long-term agreements by Jan. 2028. The latter applies specifically to Hungary and Slovakia.
• A decision to end long-term LNG imports by Jan. 2027, taken with one eye on the United States, will be formalized separately.

Why this matters

The decision to accelerate the timeline for ditching Russian gas is significant in its own right. But the switch from getting unanimous approval from the EU’s 27 members to relying instead on a qualified majority — at least 55%, or 15 countries, representing at least 60% of the bloc’s population — is even more important. It was possible to go down this route because the matter was classified as a trade issue, not a foreign policy one. That means Hungary and Slovakia cannot exercise their veto, as they have repeatedly done in votes on sanctions against Russia (which are regarded as a foreign policy matter).

The EU leadership and largest countries have long argued for changes in the voting process over sanctions. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen advocated most recently for change in her keynote speech in September. To applause from some in the Strasbourg audience, she called for breaking the “shackles of unanimity” on foreign policy questions.

Officially the EU has a mechanism to switch to using qualified majority voting — the so-called passerelle clauses. However, they have never been invoked since the EU’s treaties were last amended with the Treaty of Lisbon, which came into force in 2009. According to Article 48 (7) of the EU Treaty, changes to the way the bloc takes decisions can be made without formally amending its founding treaties (an arduous and highly political process that Brussels does not want). 

However, it requires unanimous approval in the first place to make the switch. That means any country concerned that switching to qualified majority voting would nullify the power of its veto could simply block that change. Moreover, national parliaments, not just leaders, have six months in which they can veto any change. In short, that means stripping Hungary of its blocking power will be extremely difficult. At the moment, that means it keeps its ability to thwart all political, security and foreign policy decisions taken by the bloc — including almost all sanctions on Russia and Ukraine’s future accession to the EU.

Why the world should care

Russian gas still represents 12% of the EU’s imports. Gas continues to flow through the Turkstream pipeline, and since the invasion of Ukraine, LNG trade has soared. France, Spain, Belgium and the Netherlands are main buyers, including for onward trade to Italy. The EU calculated that in 2024 member states spent more on buying Russian gas than on financial (but not military or humanitarian) aid to Ukraine: some 22 billion euros against 19 billion euros.

Adopting a decision that runs counter to the positions of Hungary and Slovakia shows that the EU is prepared to look for ways to dodge these countries’ tactical vetoes and reduce their ability to block important decisions. This cuts down the chances of a situation developing in which a country votes against extending sanctions at each six-month review, a move that could completely annul them. Officially, this possibility is still on the table, but the EU leadership is demonstrating its willingness to counter it. If Russian politicians are relying on a veto from Hungary, Slovakia or some other country to unfreeze the Central Bank’s assets, such optimism is deeply unfounded.